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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
 
 This appeal raises the question of whether a hospital 
that purchases certain pharmaceutical products from a 
wholesaler middleman has standing under Illinois Brick Co. 
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), to bring an illegal tying claim 
under federal law against the manufacturer of the 
pharmaceutical drugs, Amgen.  In Illinois Brick, the Supreme 
Court held that only direct purchasers have standing under 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act.  In this case, plaintiff-appellant 
Warren General Hospital argues that it falls squarely within 
the direct purchaser rule, despite the fact that it purchases 
Amgen‟s products through a middleman, because (1) it has a 
direct relationship with Amgen and (2) it is the first 
“overcharged” purchaser in the chain of distribution.  The 
District Court granted the defendant‟s motion to dismiss after 
finding that the hospital was an indirect purchaser of 
Amgen‟s products and thus lacked antitrust standing under 
Illinois Brick.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
1
   
                                                          
 
1
 The District Court also granted Amgen‟s motion to 
dismiss on the alternative grounds that the Complaint failed to 
allege a per se tying claim.  Because we affirm the District 
Court‟s dismissal of the complaint for lack of standing, we 
will not reach this claim. 
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I. 
 
 The following narrative is adapted from facts set forth 
in the Complaint.  Because the District Court decided this 
case on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual 
allegations in the Complaint and draw all reasonable 
inferences in plaintiff‟s favor. 
 
 Plaintiff Warren General Hospital (“Warren General”) 
is a Pennsylvania not-for-profit corporation that seeks to 
represent members of a proposed class, composed of other 
hospitals, clinics, and care centers, that purchase drugs 
manufactured by defendant Amgen.  Amgen is a corporation 
with its principal place of business in California that 
manufactures and sells pharmaceutical drugs.  On September 
25, 2009, Warren General filed an antitrust class action in the 
District of New Jersey alleging that Amgen violated antitrust 
law by “tying” the purchase of two of its drugs, Neupogen 
and Neulasta, to the sale of another Amgen drug, Aranesp.  
(Compl. ¶ 1). 
 
 The heart of plaintiff‟s claim is that Amgen used its 
knowledge of medical insurance reimbursement rates to 
leverage its market power in one market—the market for 
White Blood Cell Growth Factor (“WBCGF”) drugs—to 
impair competition in the market for Red Blood Cell Growth 
Factor (“RBCGF”) drugs.  Warren General alleges that 
Amgen violated antitrust law by creating an unlawful scheme 
that “tied” the purchase of Amgen‟s WBCGF drugs to the 
purchase of its RBCGF drugs.  Because of the low 
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reimbursement rates from medical payors the hospital 
receives for WBCGF drugs, it is not economically feasible for 
the hospital to purchase WBCGF drugs at the “market price.”  
Amgen offered Warren General discounts on purchases of its 
WBCGF drugs that were predicated on the hospital‟s 
purchase of Amgen‟s more expensive RBCGF drug.  
Although Amgen did not expressly require the hospital to 
purchase its drugs, Amgen‟s monopoly of the WBCGF 
market, combined with its rebate program, implicitly 
“forc[ed] Plaintiff and class members to make substantial 
purchases of Amgen‟s more-expensive RBCGF drug, rather 
than the cheaper competing [drug] . . . in order to avoid losing 
money on . . . purchases of Amgen‟s . . . WBCGF drugs.”  
(Compl. ¶ 1).  Absent this tying scheme, the hospital would 
have preferred to buy cheaper RBCGF drugs offered by 
Amgen‟s competitors.   
 
 Plaintiff‟s claims were brought under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 and Sections 3 and 4 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 15.  “Tying is selling one good 
(the tying product) on the condition that the buyer also 
purchase another, separate good (the tied product).”  Gordon 
v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 213 (3d Cir. 2005).
2
  
Substantively, plaintiff‟s claims are grounded in Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which 
proscribe tying schemes.  See Town Sound and Custom Tops, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 473-74 (3d Cir. 
                                                          
 
2
 A per se tying claim has three elements: “(1) a 
defendant seller ties two distinct products; (2) the seller 
possesses market power in the tying product market; and (3) a 
substantial amount of interstate commerce is affected.”  Town 
Sound, 959 F.2d at 477. 
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1992) (en banc).  Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares 
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations . . . to be 
illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1.  Section 3 of the Clayton Act makes it 
“unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to . . . 
make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . or fix a price 
charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, 
on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the . . . 
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a 
competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the 
effect . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend 
to create a monopoly.”  15 U.S.C. § 14.  Warren General 
brings this action pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 
which provides a private right of action for “any person who 
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”  15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  
 
 Amgen manufactures two WBCGF drugs, known as 
Neulasta and Neupogen.  (Compl. ¶ 3).  Neulasta and 
Neupogen treat neutropenia, “a potentially life-threatening 
white blood cell deficiency” . . . “which can compromise a 
patient‟s immune system.”  (Compl. ¶¶ 21-22).  It is often a 
side effect of chemotherapy, although it also occurs in other 
contexts. (Compl. ¶ 21).  Neulasta is the newer and more 
powerful drug, and “is roughly equal to 7 injections of 
Neupogen.”  (Compl. ¶ 22).  Warren General submits that 
Amgen holds an effective monopoly in the WBCGF market.  
(Compl. ¶ 24).  Sales of Neupogen and Neulasta make up 98 
percent of the market for WBCGF drugs; Neulasta alone 
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controls 86 percent of the WBCGF market share.
 3
  (Compl. ¶ 
24).   
 
 Amgen also manufactures a RBCGF drug called 
Aranesp.  (Compl. ¶ 2).  Aranesp is used to treat severe 
anemia of the type experienced by patients undergoing 
dialysis or chemotherapy or receiving certain treatment for 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).  (Compl. ¶ 15).  
Unlike the WBCGF market, Amgen faces real competition in 
the RBCGF market, where Ortho Biotech Labs (“Ortho”) 
sells a drug called Procrit.  (Compl. ¶ 2).  Procrit controls 
approximately 70 percent of the RBCGF drug market.  
(Compl. ¶ 2).  Yearly sales of Aranesp, Procrit, Neulasta and 
Neupogen are estimated to be several billion dollars. (Compl. 
¶¶ 4, 20, 64). 
 
 Sometime in early 2003, Amgen crafted a rebate 
program that offered the hospital and other members of the 
putative class rebates on the price of WBCGF drugs that 
correlated to purchases of Aranesp.  Without the rebates, 
Warren General “would lose money on every administration 
of [Neupogen and Neulasta]” because “the cost of buying 
[those drugs] . . . exceeded the amount of reimbursement such 
purchasers received from Medicare and other health care 
                                                          
 
3
 Another WBCGF drug, Leukine, is sold by Berlex 
Laboratories.  (Compl. ¶ 24).  Leukine holds only a “very 
small” share of the WBCGF market, a situation Warren 
General attributes to the fact that Leukine is “administered 
intravenously,” a “longer and more costly process.”  (Compl. 
¶ 24).  In comparison, Amgen‟s WBCGF drugs are 
administered by subcutaneous injection.  (Compl. ¶ 24).  
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payors.”  (Compl. ¶ 6).  Therefore, it became “commercially 
unreasonable” for plaintiff to purchase Neulasta and 
Neupogen without the rebates.  (Compl. ¶ 6).  The terms of 
the rebate program ensured that the greater the quantity of 
Aranesp that Warren General Hospital purchased, the greater 
the value of the rebates it would receive on purchases of 
Neulasta and Neupogen.   
 
 The hospital claimed two types of injuries:  First, it 
was “forced to pay more for Aranesp than they would have 
paid for Procrit,” and second, the hospital “paid more for the 
bundle of Aranesp and the WBCGF drugs than they would 
have paid for the bundle of RBCGF and WBCGF drugs.”  
(Compl. ¶ 7).  Amgen changed its rebate program over time 
so that Warren General had “to continue to purchase larger 
amounts of Aranesp just to receive the same level of rebates 
they had been receiving.”  (Compl. ¶ 5).  Meanwhile, sales of 
Aranesp increased significantly:  by 2005, sales of Aranesp 
had increased by 38 percent and were valued at $840 million.  
(Compl. ¶ 59). 
 
 The Complaint did not set forth the mechanics of the 
hospital‟s WBCGF and RBCGF purchases.  However, at the 
motion to dismiss stage, it became clear that Warren General 
Hospital in practice purchases Amgen‟s drugs through an 
independent middleman wholesaler known as 
AmerisourceBergen.   
 
 The totality of the Complaint‟s discussion of the 
hospital‟s status as a direct purchaser is contained in 
Paragraph 13: 
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During the class period, Plaintiff purchased 
Aranesp, Neulasta and Neupogen directly from 
Amgen, pursuant to a contract between Amgen 
and Plaintiff.  The contract was negotiated at 
Warren Hospital between Plaintiff and an 
Amgen representative, who continued to service 
the account.  The contract also required Amgen 
to pay the rebated dollars directly to Plaintiff, 
which it did.  
 
(Compl. ¶ 13).  The Complaint identified the relevant 
contracts and agreements between the two parties:  the 
Amgen Portfolio Contract, the Momentum Rebate, 
Momentum II, and the Enhanced Momentum II contracts.  
(Compl. ¶ 27).  Otherwise, the Complaint merely repeatedly 
characterized Warren General Hospital and other members of 
the putative class as “direct purchasers” of Amgen‟s drugs.  
See (Compl. ¶ 14) (“Amgen . . . manufactures and sells 
Aranesp [and] . . . Neupogen and Neulasta . . . to direct 
purchasers such as hospitals, doctors and oncology clinics.”); 
(Compl. ¶ 24) (“Amgen has a 98% share of the sales to direct 
purchasers such as hospitals, doctors and oncology clinics . . . 
.”); (Compl. ¶ 47) (“[T]here were no such caps on Aranesp 
purchases, which further coerced direct purchasers such as 
hospitals, doctors and oncology clinics.”); (Compl. ¶ 53) 
(“Amgen economically coerced direct purchasers such as 
hospitals, doctors and oncology clinics into purchasing their 
RBCGF product.”); (Compl. ¶ 60) (“Amgen‟s efforts to use 
its monopoly power in the WBCGF drug market to coerce 
direct purchasers such as hospitals, doctors and oncology 
clinics into buying substantial amounts of Aranesp caused 
those purchasers to substantially overpay . . . . ”); (Compl. ¶ 
70) (“Plaintiff brings this action . . . as [a] representative of a 
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[c]lass of all direct purchasers . . . .”). 
 
 Amgen filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that 
Warren General lacked antitrust standing under Illinois Brick, 
which permits only direct purchasers to advance antitrust 
claims under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.  The District Court 
granted Amgen‟s motion and dismissed the Complaint in its 
entirety on the ground that Warren General Hospital was not 
a “direct purchaser” within the meaning of Illinois Brick. 
 The District Court noted that the Complaint did not 
identify the role played by the wholesaler and found that it 
was appropriate to rely on extrinsic evidence, namely the four 
contracts and agreements upon which the Complaint relied.
4
  
“[T]he parties agree[d] that, as documents explicitly referred 
to and relied on by the Complaint, the contracts may be 
considered by the Court on this motion to dismiss, even 
though the documents are extraneous to the Complaint.”  
Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 2010 WL 2326254, *1 n.2 
(D.N.J. June 7, 2010).  After examining the contracts 
identified in the Complaint, the District Court found that 
Warren General purchased Amgen products through a 
wholesaler known as AmerisourceBergen.   Id. at *1.  The 
court described the relationship between the plaintiff, the 
defendant, and the wholesaler as follows:  
 
                                                          
 
4
 As a general rule, “a district court ruling on a motion 
to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the 
pleadings.”  West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. 
UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  However, “a limited exception 
exists for documents that are integral to or explicitly relied 
upon in the complaint.” Id. (same). 
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Warren General and other end users of the 
drugs transacted their purchases from Amgen 
pursuant to contracts identified in the 
Complaint as the Amgen Portfolio Contract 
(“APC”), Momentum Rebate, Momentum II 
and Enhanced Momentum II.  (Compl., ¶ 27.) 
The contracts are negotiated by a Group 
Purchasing Organization (“GPO”) on behalf of 
member hospitals. The Enhanced Momentum II 
contract, pursuant to which Warren General 
made purchases, structures the transaction so 
that Amgen sells Aranesp, Neupogen and 
Neulasta to wholesalers, which in turn sell to 
hospitals. Plaintiff acknowledges in its brief that 
it purchased through wholesaler 
[AmerisourceBergen].  
 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  In the medical field, GPOs “negotiate 
standardized contracts with manufacturers and suppliers of 
medical devices on behalf of their members.”  Id. at *1 n.3 
(citation and quotation marks omitted).  The District Court 
concluded that the Complaint‟s characterization of Warren 
General as a “direct purchaser” was “squarely contradicted by 
the purchase contracts on which the Complaint relies” which 
“demonstrate that Warren General pays a wholesaler, not 
Amgen for the products based on prices which have been set 
by the wholesaler.”  Id. at *3.  Under these circumstances, 
“the written instrument controls.”  Id. (citing ALA, Inc. v. 
CCAir, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994)).   
 
 After reviewing the Illinois Brick case law, including a 
Ninth Circuit case with similar facts, Delaware Valley 
Surgical Supply, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 1116, 
12 
 
1123-24 (9th Cir. 2008), the District Court held that the 
hospital purchased Amgen‟s drugs through 
AmerisourceBergen and thus was an indirect purchaser barred 
from asserting this illegal tying claim.  The court found that 
the Complaint‟s characterization of the plaintiff as a “‟direct 
purchaser‟ merely parrots the Illinois Brick requirement, 
without providing any factual basis.”  Id. at *3.  Dismissal of 
the Complaint in its entirety followed.
5
  Id. at *7. 
 
 Warren General filed this timely appeal on June 14, 
2010.
6
  
 
II. 
 
 Our review of a district court‟s dismissal of a 
complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary.
7
  Lum v. 
                                                          
 
5
 The District Court also rejected the possibility that 
Warren General fell under the cost-plus exception to Illinois 
Brick.  Plaintiff does not appeal that conclusion. 
 
 
6
 We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final 
decision of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 
7
 The District Court described Amgen‟s motion to 
dismiss as a motion for failure to state a claim and ultimately 
dismissed the complaint for lack of statutory standing.  For 
purposes of our review, this distinction is irrelevant.  Under 
most circumstances, “[a] dismissal for lack of statutory 
standing is effectively the same as a dismissal for failure to 
state a claim.”  Baldwin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 
F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 
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Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  “The 
issue of antitrust standing is a legal issue, over which we 
exercise plenary review.”  McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 
80 F.3d 842, 847 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing In re Lower Lake Erie 
Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1164 (3d Cir. 
1993)).  
 
 In reviewing a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), “we accept all factual allegations as true, 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.”  Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 
n.7 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss 
may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations 
in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff's claims 
lack facial plausibility.  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).  This requires a plaintiff to plead 
“sufficient factual matter to show that the claim is facially 
plausible,” thus enabling “the court to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged.”  
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  After 
Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937 
(2009), “conclusory or bare-bones allegations will no longer 
survive a motion to dismiss: threadbare recitals of the 
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 
statements, do not suffice.”  Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  While the complaint 
“does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a formulaic 
                                                                                                                                  
F.3d 472, 482 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000). Our standard of review is 
the same in either case.  Baldwin, 636 F.3d at 73. 
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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.    
 
 On appeal, Warren General Hospital argues that the 
District Court erred in finding that it lacked standing under 
Illinois Brick to pursue an illegal tying claim.  Warren 
General urges us to find that it is a “direct purchaser” within 
the meaning of Illinois Brick.  Warren General does not frame 
this argument as one of creating an “exception” to Illinois 
Brick; on the contrary, it expressly disavows that approach.  
Warren General advances two other arguments.  First, it 
maintains that the mechanics of the purchasing relationship 
between itself, the wholesaler, and Amgen reveal that, in fact, 
it is the direct purchaser of Amgen‟s pharmaceutical 
products.  Alternatively, Warren General contends that it has 
direct purchaser standing under Illinois Brick because it is 
“the first and only party in the distribution chain to be injured 
by Amgen‟s tying scheme.”  (Appellant Br. 35).   
 
 We find it useful to begin by reviewing the origins of 
the direct purchaser doctrine.  Section 4 of the Clayton Act 
provides that “any person who shall be injured in his business 
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws may sue . . . in any district court of the United States in 
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has 
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and 
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the 
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney‟s fee.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 15.  The Supreme Court has developed two limitations on 
Section 4.  See Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 713 
F.2d 958, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1983).  The first restriction, the 
“direct purchaser rule,” limits antitrust actions to suits 
brought by parties that are the direct purchasers of the 
15 
 
product.  See generally Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 
(1977).  The second limitation asks whether the “injuries [are] 
too remote [from an antitrust violation] to give them standing 
to sue for damages under § 4.”  Blue Shield of Va. v. 
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 (1982) (bracketing in 
original).
8
  In this appeal, only the first limitation is at issue.  
 
 The direct purchaser rule was first considered by the 
Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. 
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).  There, the namesake shoe 
manufacturer brought suit against a manufacturer and 
distributor of shoe machinery, alleging that the manufacturer 
had illegally monopolized the shoe industry, in violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 483-84.  The defendant 
argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue under Section 
4 of the Clayton Act because the plaintiff had effectively 
“passed on” any injury to its customers.9  Id. at 488 n.6.  The 
                                                          
 
8
 This is in addition to, and distinct from, the 
constitutional requirement of injury in fact.  See Associated 
Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983).  
 
 
9
 In general, “[p]assing on describes the action of an 
overcharged buyer who passes the extra expense on to those 
who buy from him.”  In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litig., 
579 F.2d 13, 16 n.4 (3d Cir. 1978) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The “passing-on” theory has been invoked in one 
of two ways: “Defensive passing on refers to efforts by 
antitrust defendants to show that a particular plaintiff was not 
injured because he had foisted the inflated price onto his own 
customers.  Offensive passing on is used to characterize 
plaintiffs' strategy proving that an overcharge was imposed 
16 
 
Supreme Court rejected that defense, finding that only the 
direct purchaser of an illegally overcharged good, and not 
others in the chain of manufacturing or distribution, is the 
party “injured” within the meaning of Section 4.  Id. at 489-
91.  The Court based its decision on two conclusions:  (1) if 
indirect purchasers were permitted to bring antitrust suits, the 
offer of proof alleging injury and the extent of that injury 
would become extremely complicated, id. at 491-93, and (2) 
because indirect purchasers would have “only a tiny stake in a 
lawsuit” and have fewer incentives to sue, a doctrine that 
allowed only indirect purchasers to bring suit would enable 
antitrust violators to “retain the fruits of their illegality,” id. at 
493-94.  
 
 Illinois Brick tackled the next logical question:  may 
an indirect purchaser bring suit against an antitrust violator 
on the ground that the overcharge cost was passed on to him 
by the direct purchaser?  431 U.S. at 726.  In that case, the 
defendant was a brick manufacturer and distributor who sold 
bricks to masonry contractors, who then in turn submitted 
bids (relying on those bricks) to general contractors.  Id.  
These general contractors then created and submitted bids to 
final consumers, like the State of Illinois, who became the 
indirect purchaser of the bricks.  Id.  The State of Illinois, 
representing a number of customers, sued the original 
manufacturer of the bricks under Section 4 of the Clayton Act 
alleging that the brick manufacturer had engaged in an illegal 
price-fixing conspiracy.  Id. at 726-27.  The Supreme Court 
held that Illinois, which purchased the bricks following “two 
                                                                                                                                  
upon them by buyers closer to the defendant in the chain of 
distribution.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
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separate levels in the chain of distribution,” id. at 726, was an 
indirect purchaser without standing, id. at 735.  
 
 Illinois Brick rests on three policy considerations.  The 
first policy rationale that the Court drew on was the “serious 
risk of multiple liability for defendants.”  Id. at 730.  The 
Court found that permitting the offensive use of the pass-on 
theory without the defensive use (prohibited in Hanover 
Shoe) would “create a serious risk of multiple liability for 
defendants,” since defendants could be sued by indirect 
purchasers and direct purchasers.  Id.  This would 
“substantially increase[] the possibility of inconsistent 
adjudications and therefore of unwarranted multiple liability.”  
Id.   
 
 Next, the Court drew attention to the “evidentiary 
complexities and uncertainties” involved in ascertaining how 
much of the overcharge was “passed on” to the indirect 
purchasers.  Id. at 732.  This problem, which constituted 
“[t]he principal basis for the decision in Hanover Shoe,” was 
also present in the Illinois Brick factual scenario.  Id. at 731-
32.  The calculations necessary to determine how much of the 
overcharge had been “passed on” would be “long and 
complicated” and would have to be “repeated at each point at 
which the price-fixed goods changed hands before they 
reached the plaintiff.”  Id. at 732-33 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Therefore, “the difficulty of reconstructing the 
pricing decisions of intermediate purchasers at each step in 
the chain beyond the direct purchaser generally will outweigh 
any gain in simplicity from not having to litigate the effects of 
the passed-on overcharge on the direct purchaser‟s volume.”  
Id. at 733 n.13.  This is because of the “uncertainties and 
difficulties in analyzing price and out-put decisions in the real 
18 
 
economic world rather than an economist‟s hypothetical 
model.”  Id. at 731-32 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 Finally, the Court also examined the third policy 
rationale: the need for effective enforcement of antitrust law.  
Id. at 733-34.  Relying on Hanover Shoe, the Court explained 
that “the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by 
concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct 
purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially 
affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could 
show was absorbed by it.”  Id. at 735.   Therefore, this 
rationale also weighed against conferring direct purchaser 
status. 
 
 Although the direct purchaser rule was grounded in 
these policy rationales, the Supreme Court explicitly stated 
that its rule was the result of statutory construction.  Id. at 
736-37 (explaining that “considerations of stare decisis weigh 
heavily in the area of statutory construction” and a 
“presumption of adherence to our prior decisions construing 
legislative enactments would support our reaffirmance of the 
Hanover Shoe construction of [Section 4]”).  In making this 
point, the Court manifested its unwillingness to recognize any 
exceptions to the direct purchaser rule, id. at 743-45, warning 
that “the process of classifying various market situations 
according to the amount of pass-on likely to be involved and 
its susceptibility of proof in a judicial forum would entail the 
very problems that the Hanover Shoe rule was meant to 
avoid,” id. at 744-45.  
 
 The final case in this trilogy is Kansas v. UtiliCorp 
United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).  In UtiliCorp, several 
public utilities brought suit against a pipeline company and 
19 
 
natural gas producers under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 
alleging that the defendants conspired to inflate the price of 
the natural gas supplied to public utilities.  Id. at 204-05.  The 
states of Kansas and Missouri, acting as parens patriae, 
asserted the same claims on behalf of all persons residing in 
the states who purchased the gas.  Id. at 204.  The defendants 
argued that the utility companies—the direct purchasers of 
the gas—lacked standing to bring suit because state and 
municipal regulations ensured that the utility companies had 
“passed on” 100 percent of the alleged overcharge to their 
customers.  Id. at 205.  The states argued that the residential 
customers should have standing to bring suit because none of 
the policies underlying Hanover Shoe or Illinois Brick were 
implicated and because the customers bore the full cost of the 
price-fixing conspiracy.  Id. at 208. 
 
 The Supreme Court acknowledged that “the rationales 
of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick may not apply with equal 
force in all instances” but held that it was “inconsistent with 
precedent and imprudent in any event to create an exception 
for regulated public utilities.”  Id.  With regard to the states‟ 
argument that there would be no litigation over the 
apportionment of the overcharge because they “prove the 
exact injury to the residential customers,” id., the Court found 
that this argument “oversimplified the apportionment 
problem,” id. at 209.  First, the nature of market forces meant 
it was possible that the overcharge still injured the utility, 
“even if the utility raise[d] its rates to offset its increased 
costs.”  Id.  Second, “[e]ven if, at some point, a utility can 
pass on 100 percent of its costs to its customers, various 
factors may delay the passing-on process,” and thus the utility 
is also injured by the defendant‟s actions.  Id. at 210.  The 
states also argued Illinois Brick‟s second policy rationale, the 
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risk of multiple recoveries, was inapplicable because the 
plaintiffs sought different damages, that is, the residents 
“would recover the amount of the overcharge and the utilities 
would recover damages for their lost sales.”  Id. at 212-13.  
The Court roundly rejected this argument, noting that the 
“case already ha[d] become quite complicated” and 
“involve[d] numerous utilities and other companies . . . under 
federal, state, and municipal regulation” and had the potential 
to expand to other direct purchasers and unrepresented 
consumers.  Id. at 213.  Any “expansion of the case would 
risk the confusion, costs, and possibility of error inherent in 
complex litigation.”  Id.  Finally, the Court concluded by 
dismissing the argument that suits by indirect purchasers are 
more effective at “promot[ing] the vigorous enforcement of 
the antitrust laws.”  Id. at 214.  
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
 We now turn to Warren General Hospital‟s first 
argument:  that, in practice and based on the facts in the 
Complaint and its cited agreements, the hospital is the direct 
purchaser of Amgen‟s products under Illinois Brick.  The 
hospital argues that the District Court “improperly exalted 
form over substance in failing to look beyond the existence of 
a wholesaler and ignoring many other facts that are evidence 
of [Warren General‟s] purchaser status,” and urges us to hold 
that the District Court erred when it found that the hospital 
was an indirect purchaser.  (Appellant Br. 26). 
 
 In support, the hospital directs our attention to the 
following features of its relationship with Amgen:  (1) 
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“Amgen required [Warren General] to negotiate the purchase 
requirements, rebates and thus net prices for Aranesp, 
Neulasta, and Neupogen directly with Amgen”, id. at 26-27; 
(2) Amgen required Warren General to “only communicate 
directly with Amgen on the net costs and on any other issue 
regarding these drugs”, id.; (3) the contracts between Warren 
General and Amgen were negotiated at the hospital; (4) the 
contracts were serviced by an Amgen representative; (5) the 
costs and rebate amounts were set by Amgen; (6) the rebate 
opportunities for Warren General were not contingent on 
AmerisourceBergen‟s purchases; and (7) Amgen paid the 
rebates directly to Warren General.  
 
 After considering the Complaint, the contracts and 
documents referred to therein, and the parties‟ arguments on 
appeal, we conclude that the District Court correctly 
determined that plaintiff was an indirect purchaser of 
Amgen‟s products and, therefore, the Complaint failed to 
allege a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6).  The mechanics 
of the transactions between Warren General, Amgen, and 
AmerisourceBergen reveal Warren General to be an indirect 
purchaser of Amgen‟s WBCGF and RBCGF drugs.  First, 
when Warren General wants to purchase Amgen‟s WBCGF 
and RBCGF drugs it places its order through 
AmerisourceBergen.  Accordingly, AmerisourceBergen 
charges Warren General for its order.  Second, 
AmerisourceBergen maintains the right to set the price of the 
drugs it sells, and thus AmerisourceBergen‟s price is not 
necessarily the price it paid Amgen.  Third, Warren General 
physically takes delivery of the shipment from 
AmerisourceBergen.  Fourth, Warren General pays 
AmerisourceBergen directly; it transmits no funds to Amgen.  
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 We agree that the hospital is “the immediate buyer” 
from AmerisourceBergen, and does not purchase directly 
from the “alleged antitrust violators.”  UtiliCorp, 497 U.S. at 
207.   The purchases go through at least one other stage in the 
chain of distribution before reaching Warren General, and 
therefore the situation before us is akin to the facts in 
UtiliCorp and Illinois Brick.  There are no allegations that 
AmerisourceBergen is controlled or owned by Amgen and 
thus part of the conspiracy; AmerisourceBergen is a publicly 
traded company.  (Appellee Br. 12).  In light of this record, 
there is no way of getting around the conclusion that Warren 
General is the second purchaser in the chain of distribution.   
 
 The facts that Warren General marshals in its support 
do not persuade us otherwise.  We assume the truth of the 
Complaint‟s allegations that Amgen and Warren General 
negotiated the value of the rebates directly, that those 
negotiations took place on the hospital‟s property, that 
Warren General communicated exclusively with Amgen 
about any cost and issues relating to the drugs, that Warren 
General was “serviced” by an Amgen representative, and that 
Warren General‟s “rebate opportunities” were not contingent 
on AmerisourceBergen‟s purchases.  Nevertheless, these facts 
do not transform Warren General into a direct purchaser.  At 
best, they reveal that there were some direct interactions 
between Amgen and the hospital relating to the rebate 
program and the volume of Amgen drugs the hospital 
required.   
 
 The only direct financial transaction between Amgen 
and Warren General was Amgen‟s payment of the rebates 
directly to Warren General.  Even this financial transaction 
does not confer direct purchaser standing on the hospital.  The 
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value of the rebates was transmitted after the purchases had 
concluded.  The key question in an illegal tying claim is 
whether the plaintiff purchased the tied product from the 
antitrust defendant.  In this case, the hospital simply did not.   
 The situation is similar to one that arises when a 
customer buys, for example, a bottle of shampoo from a 
supermarket.  The shampoo manufacturer may offer a rebate 
to the customer that the customer must submit directly to the 
manufacturer.  Yet it cannot be said that the customer 
purchased the shampoo from the manufacturer just because it 
subsequently received a rebate from the manufacturer.  The 
customer paid the price of the shampoo directly to the 
supermarket and received the shampoo from the supermarket.  
The customer is an indirect purchaser of the shampoo even if 
the manufacturer set the price of the rebate or communicated 
with the customer regarding his purchase.  
 
 In analyzing the mechanics of the purchasing 
relationship between Amgen, Warren General, and 
AmerisourceBergen, our decision in Howard Hess Dental 
Laboratories Inc. v. Dentsply International, Inc., 424 F.3d 363 
(3d Cir. 2005), is instructive.  In that case, the plaintiffs were 
dental laboratories that manufactured dentures using artificial 
teeth made by Dentsply.  Id. at 366.  The plaintiffs brought a 
class action on behalf of themselves and other laboratories 
that manufactured dentures, asserting that Dentsply and its 
dealers conspired to monopolize and fix prices in violation of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Sections 3 and 4 of the 
Clayton Act.  Id.  The complaint alleged that the laboratories 
“purchased [the teeth] through Dentsply Dealers”.  Id. at 372.  
We held that the dental laboratories were indirect purchasers 
of Dentsply‟s products and thus lacked standing under Illinois 
Brick.  Id. at 371.  Plaintiffs also sought direct purchaser 
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standing “for teeth drop shipped directly from Dentsply to the 
labs.”10  Id. at 372.  With regard to that allegation, we held 
that plaintiffs could not “avoid Illinois Brick by claiming they 
were direct purchasers of drop shipments when their 
complaint specifically alleges that they did not directly 
purchase from Dentsply.”  Id. at 372-73.   
 
 Moreover, even assuming that “some of the teeth are 
drop shipped directly from Dentsply,” that did not change 
“the economic substance of the transaction.”  Id. at 373.  The 
facts still made out that the laboratories were indirect 
purchasers because: 
 
 [T]he dealers still make the sale to Plaintiffs 
and Dentsply makes the sale to the dealers. 
Plaintiffs pay the dealers their usual price, the 
dealers take their profit, and then the dealers 
pay Dentsply. While it is true that the dealers 
do not take physical possession of the teeth, 
this is nothing but a formal difference from the 
typical transaction. Thus, even as to teeth drop 
shipped directly from Dentsply to the labs, 
Plaintiffs are indirect purchasers potentially 
subject to Illinois Brick. 
                                                          
 
10
 Drop shipping occurs when “a dealer does not have 
certain teeth in stock or could not fulfill a [customer]‟s order 
for some other reason and asks Dentsply to ship the teeth 
directly to a [customer].  When teeth are drop shipped, the 
dealer never has physical custody of them, but it does bill the 
[customer] for the teeth, collect payments from the 
[customer], and pay Dentsply.”  Howard Hess, 424 F.3d at 
367. 
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Id. at 373 (internal citation omitted).  The transactions 
between Warren General, AmerisourceBergen, and Amgen 
share similar features.  AmerisourceBergen “make[s] the sale 
to Plaintiff[]” while the antitrust defendant “makes the sale to 
the dealer[].”  Warren General pays the middleman its price, 
who “take[s] [its] profits,” and finally AmerisourceBergen 
“pay[s]” Amgen.  Id.  Moreover, Warren General takes 
“physical possession” of the drugs from AmerisourceBergen, 
and unlike the situation in Howard Hess, there are no direct 
shipments between Amgen and the hospital.  
 
 Warren General maintains that the Enhanced 
Momentum II Contract, which is cited in the Complaint, 
reveals the existence of a contract “between Amgen and 
[Warren General] for the purchase of Amgen‟s drugs.”  
(Appellant Br. 29) (emphasis added).  The Enhanced 
Momentum II Contract, dated March 31, 2005, sets forth the 
WBCGF “Rebate Opportunit[ies]” available to Warren 
General based on its net purchases of RBCGF.  (JA 220).  
Again, there is no doubt that Amgen and Warren General had 
some direct interactions.  However, in our view the Enhanced 
Momentum II Contract does not confer direct purchaser 
standing on Warren General.  The Enhanced Momentum II 
Contract sets forth the parameters of the rebate program.  It is 
not a contract for purchases.  Moreover,  Warren General‟s 
status as an indirect purchaser is borne out by another 
document cited in the Complaint, the Amgen Portfolio 
Contract.  This sample letter agreement sets forth the 
standards for “physician practice[s]” to participate in 
Amgen‟s rebate program.  (JA 43).  The agreement reveals 
the role of the middleman wholesaler as an intermediary 
between Amgen and Warren General.  The agreement notes 
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that qualifying physician practices are represented by “a 
group purchasing organization” which “acts on behalf of its 
member[s].”  (JA 43).  It notes that the physician practices 
and the GPO have a separate agreement and states the 
physician practice “has engaged Purchasing Group as an 
exclusive agent to provide purchasing opportunities for its 
eligible members.”  (JA 43) (emphasis added).   
 
 On appeal, Warren General Hospital also asks us to 
consider several documents that the District Court 
“overlooked.”  (Appellant Br. 30).  This argument is 
unavailing.  As a threshold matter, we note that, because 
standing was decided at the motion to dismiss stage, the 
District Court properly limited itself to the pleadings 
contained in the Complaint and the agreements cited therein.  
See West Penn, 627 F.3d at 97.  Moreover, assuming that the 
District Court had considered these documents, they would 
not have resulted in a different outcome.
11
    
                                                          
 
11
 This evidence consists of: (1) a sample 2004 
“Physician Clinic Agreement,” referring to the “purchase” of 
the drugs by “Physician Practice[s];” (2) a 2008 “Physician 
Clinic Agreement” stating that any conflict between the 
clinics relating to “any purchaser order or invoice” was 
controlled by the clinic‟s Agreement with Amgen; (3) a 2007 
letter from Amgen to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services discussing a proposed rule that included an 
attachment where Amgen referred to patients as “customers”; 
(4) a 2007 letter sent by Amgen to class members that address 
doctors, clinics, and hospitals as “valued customer[s],” and 
(5) a template contract between Amgen and a sample clinic 
that refers to “purchasing opportunities” for eligible members 
and “purchases” by physicians.  (Appellant Br. 31-33) 
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 Finally, Warren General Hospital directs us to two 
cases that, in its view, reveal that a more flexible approach in 
determining direct purchaser status is appropriate.  See 
Gulfstream III Assocs., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 
                                                                                                                                  
(emphases omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Warren General also draws our attention to statements 
Amgen made in Ortho Biotech Products, LP., v. Amgen Inc., 
Case No. 05-cv-4850 (D.N.J.), an antitrust suit Aranesp 
manufacturer Ortho brought against Amgen. 
 
 These various documents do not give rise to direct 
purchaser standing.  First, there is no allegation that Warren 
General was a party to these agreements or contracts.  
Moreover, although the contracts show that Amgen permitted 
physician clinics to purchase products either directly from 
Amgen or from “Authorized Wholesalers,” Warren General 
concedes that all of its purchases were through a wholesaler.  
Therefore, even if we considered those agreements, they 
would not support the hospital‟s position.  Second, we 
question the relevance of Amgen‟s characterization of its 
relationship with class members in promotional materials or 
correspondence to an agency in a different context.  Even if 
Amgen considered hospitals and clinics to be “customers,” 
that would not negate the fact that Amgen sold its products to 
hospitals and clinics through an intervening customer—the 
middleman agency.  We find for the same reason that 
Amgen‟s use of the word “customer” or “purchaser” in 
describing hospitals and clinics, or its failure to mention 
AmerisourceBergen in responding to Ortho‟s complaint in a 
separate lawsuit, does not contradict our conclusion that 
Warren General is an indirect purchaser.     
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995 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Mercedes-Benz Anti-Trust 
Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 468 (D.N.J. 2005).  These cases are 
distinguishable.  In Gulfstream III, the plaintiff signed an 
agreement to purchase an aircraft, but assigned its purchase 
agreement to another party before the plane was ready for 
delivery.  995 F.2d at 430.  We held that the plaintiff was a 
direct purchaser under Illinois Brick because, despite 
subsequently assigning that right to another party, he had 
signed the original purchase agreement and thus “remained 
contractually bound to pay the [aircraft‟s] total purchase price 
up to and including the date of delivery.”  Id.  Thus, he began 
his relationship as a direct purchaser; the issue was whether 
he retained that status.   
 
 Whether Mercedes-Benz was properly decided or not, 
it is also distinguishable.  There, plaintiffs were lessees of 
Mercedes-Benz automobiles who sued Mercedes-Benz and its 
dealers for price-fixing the costs of repair parts.  364 F. Supp. 
2d at 476-78.  The district court held that the lessees were 
direct purchasers because of “[t]he mechanics of how a 
leasing transaction is initiated,” id. at 480, namely the car 
lessees negotiated the monthly lease payments directly with 
the dealership, made its first payments to the dealership, and 
received the car from the dealership.  Id. at 472.  In the matter 
before us, Warren General did not begin its relationship with 
Amgen as a direct purchaser.  Although Warren General and 
Amgen negotiated the terms of the rebate contracts, plaintiff 
never placed product orders with Amgen, never paid Amgen 
directly, and never received any drugs directly from Amgen. 
   
 For these reasons, we hold that Warren General 
Hospital is an indirect purchaser of Amgen‟s WBCGF and 
RBCGF drugs and therefore the District Court did not err in 
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dismissing plaintiff‟s complaint for lack of standing.  This 
result is in line with numerous other cases from this Court 
recognizing that standing lies with the direct purchaser and 
not any subsequent downstream purchaser.  See Recordex, 80 
F.3d at 852 (plaintiff clients whose attorneys had purchased 
copies of clients‟ records from photocopying services were 
indirect purchasers of the photocopies, and thus did not have 
standing under “the absolute bar of the „direct purchaser‟ 
rule”); Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 
929-33 (3d Cir. 1986) (customers of dealerships who alleged 
that Mercedes-Benz had forced its dealers to purchase parts 
for repairing vehicle at fixed prices were indirect purchasers 
of Mercedes-Benz parts); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. 
Cont‟l Grp., Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979)  (plaintiffs that 
purchased “consumer bags” from wholesaler middleman 
lacked standing to bring an antitrust action against 
manufacturer of bags). 
 
B. 
 
 We now turn to Warren General Hospital‟s argument 
that it has antitrust standing because it is the first injured party 
in the chain of distribution.  The hospital submits that Illinois 
Brick—and the policies underlying the direct purchaser 
rule—confer standing on the first harmed direct purchaser, 
not just the direct purchaser.  Applying that theory here, the 
hospital advances the following facts: (1) Warren General 
bore the full cost of the overcharge caused by Amgen‟s rebate 
scheme; (2) the wholesaler was not affected by the 
overcharge and was never subject to or targeted by the illegal 
tying scheme; and (3) the wholesaler was not injured by 
Amgen‟s actions.  Warren General further submits that, 
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because AmerisourceBergen was not injured by Amgen‟s 
actions, it would not have standing to sue Amgen.   
 
 It is a basic tenet of antitrust law that a cause of action 
will not lie if the plaintiff has not been harmed.  See 
Gulfstream III, 995 F.2d at 429.  However, the hospital‟s 
argument conflates the different components of antitrust 
standing: the statutory requirement contained in Section 4 that 
the plaintiff be the direct purchaser as set forth in Illinois 
Brick and the requirement that the plaintiff have suffered a 
recognizable injury.  See McCready, 457 U.S. at 476 
(“Analytically distinct from the restrictions on the § 4 remedy 
recognized in  . . . Illinois Brick, there is the conceptually 
more difficult question of which persons have sustained 
injuries too remote [from an antitrust violation] to give them 
standing to sue for damages under § 4.”) (bracketing in 
original) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see 
also Gulfstream III, 995 F.2d at 429 (“[T]he focus of the 
doctrine of „antitrust standing‟ is somewhat different from 
that of standing as a constitutional doctrine. Harm to the 
antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional 
standing requirement of injury in fact, but the court must 
make a further determination whether the plaintiff is a proper 
party to bring a private antitrust action.”) (quoting Associated 
Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983)).   
 
 The question in this case is whether Warren General is 
a direct purchaser under Illinois Brick, and we hold that it is 
not.  Hanover Shoe and its progeny did not resolve what party 
was a direct purchaser by calculating exactly where the harm 
lay.  In fact, the Court‟s discussion in those cases of the 
policy rationales underpinning the rule manifests the Court‟s 
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intent to avoid linking direct purchaser status to injury 
calculations and determinations.  In UtiliCorp, the consumer 
plaintiffs also argued that the public utility (the direct 
purchaser) had not been harmed by the antitrust defendant‟s 
actions, and that consumers had borne the full brunt of the 
injuries, thus justifying an exception to the Illinois Brick rule.  
The Court highlighted the need to apply the rule consistently: 
 
[T]he process of classifying various market 
situations according to the amount of pass-on 
likely to be involved and its susceptibility of 
proof in a judicial forum would entail the very 
problems that the Hanover Shoe rule was meant 
to avoid. The litigation over where the line 
should be drawn in a particular class of cases 
would inject the same „massive evidence and 
complicated theories into treble-damages 
proceedings, albeit at a somewhat higher level 
of generality.  
 
In sum, even assuming that any economic 
assumptions underlying the Illinois Brick rule 
might be disproved in a specific case, we think 
it an unwarranted and counterproductive 
exercise to litigate a series of exceptions. 
Having stated the rule in Hanover Shoe, and 
adhered to it in Illinois Brick, we stand by our 
interpretation of § 4. 
 
497 U.S. at 216-17 (citations omitted). 
 
 In support of its more expansive reading of Illinois 
Brick, Warren General directs us to Sports Racing Services, 
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Inc. v. Sports Car Club of America, Inc., 131 F.3d 874 (10th 
Cir. 1997).  Warren General submits that in Sports Racing, 
“the plaintiff was not barred under Illinois Brick because he 
was „the first person with a cause of action‟ under the illegal 
tying scheme, and there was „no other person who could 
assert a claim for illegal tying as a purchaser.‟”  (Appellant 
Br. 38).  We are not persuaded by this reading of Sports 
Racing, which in any case does not bind this Court.  In the 
section plaintiff relies on, the Tenth Circuit is describing the 
direct purchaser cases as “recogniz[ing] standing . . . in the . . 
. direct victim of the anticompetitive activity and the first 
person with a cause of action.”  Id. at 889.  In describing the 
Illinois Brick rule, the court was simply equating the “direct 
victim” as the “first person with a cause of action.”  Id.  The 
court‟s later discussion makes this clear:  “The Illinois Brick 
rule selects the better plaintiff between two possible types of 
plaintiffs—direct purchasers and indirect purchasers. The 
Court chose the direct purchaser primarily to simplify 
damages determinations and limit the possibility of multiple 
recovery against the defendant.”  Id.   
 
 Moreover, the holding of Sports Racing does not 
contradict our holding in this case.  There, the plaintiff John 
Freeman asserted both an illegal tying claim, based on the 
defendant‟s tying of “a racer‟s purchase of [the defendant‟s] 
racing services . . . to the purchase of cars and parts sold by 
[the defendant‟s exclusive dealerships],” and a monopoly 
claim alleging that the defendant created a monopoly in car 
parts.  Id. at 879.  The Tenth Circuit agreed that Freeman was 
“not a direct purchaser from defendants of the tied product 
(the cars and parts)” but was a direct purchaser of the tying 
product, the car racing services.  Id. at 887.  However, the fact 
that Freeman bought the tied product from a third party was 
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not fatal to his tying claim, because the defendants required 
Freeman to purchase the tied product “indirectly through a 
[sub-dealership] supplied by [the defendant] rather than 
through an independent source.”  Id.  Thus, this did not 
present “a typical tying situation.”  Id.  In this case, of course, 
Warren General buys neither the tying product nor the tied 
product from Amgen; the facts show that the hospital buys 
them directly from an “independent source.”   
 
   Finally, we find that the three policy rationales 
sustaining the direct purchaser rule are present in this case.  
Warren General argues that there is no risk of duplicative 
recovery in this case, because AmerisourceBergen was not 
injured by the illegal tying scheme and has no standing to sue.  
However, we are not persuaded by plaintiff‟s assurances that 
AmerisourceBergen was not injured by Amgen‟s rebate 
program.  The second policy rationale underlying the rule 
relates to the “evidentiary complexities and uncertainties 
involved in ascertaining the portion of the overcharge that the 
direct purchasers had passed on to the various levels of 
indirect purchasers.”  Howard Hess, 424 F.3d at 369-70.  
Warren General contends that we can easily determine how 
much of the overcharge created by the illegal tying scheme 
was “passed on” to the hospital:  the entire cost of the 
overcharge was passed on because AmerisourceBergen‟s role 
was to set a market price for WBCGF and RBCGF drugs and 
then process Warren General‟s orders.  Therefore, so Warren 
General contends, Amgen‟s rebate program only affected the 
ultimate price that Warren General paid for the drugs.   
 
 This argument oversimplifies the injury calculation.  In 
its direct purchaser cases, the Supreme Court has consistently 
emphasized the difficulty in calculating how market forces 
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work on the different purchasers and sellers in an economic 
system.  “The principal basis for the decision in Hanover 
Shoe was the Court‟s perception of the uncertainties and 
difficulties in analyzing price and out-put decisions in the real 
economic world rather than an economist‟s hypothetical 
model, and of the costs to the judicial system and the efficient 
enforcement of the antitrust laws of attempting to reconstruct 
those decisions in the courtroom.”  Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 
731-32 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  In 
UtiliCorp, the plaintiffs also argued that apportioning 
damages would be simple; because the utility company 
“passed on” 100 percent of the overcharge, its customers 
were injured by the whole amount of the overcharge.  
Although the Court seemed to agree that the apportionment 
question was easier in that case, it nonetheless noted that the 
apportionment calculation presented serious difficulties:  
 
[W]e do not know whether the [plaintiff 
UtiliCorp United, a public utility corporation] 
could have raised its prices prior to the 
overcharge. Its customers [the indirect 
purchasers] may have been willing to pay a 
greater price . . . . To the extent that [UtiliCorp 
United] could have sought and gained 
permission to raise its rates in the absence of an 
overcharge, at least some portion of the 
overcharge is being borne by it; whether by 
overcharge or by increased rates, consumers 
would have been paying more for natural gas 
than they had been paying in the past. Because 
of this potential injury, [UtiliCorp United] must 
remain in the suit. If we were to add indirect 
purchasers to the action, we would have to 
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devise an apportionment formula. This is the 
very complexity that Hanover Shoe and Illinois 
Brick sought to avoid. 
 
497 U.S. at 210.   
 
 Because of the complicated interplay between market 
forces, the possibility that the wholesaler was harmed by 
defendant‟s actions exists even if the majority of the injury is 
borne by the indirect purchaser.  The prices charged by the 
wholesaler are typically set by demand for the products it 
sells.  Mid-West Paper Prods., 596 F.2d at 584 (“As noted in 
Hanover Shoe, “(a) wide range of factors influence a 
company‟s pricing policies.  . . . [P]ricing decisions are [also] 
based on various other considerations, such as marketing 
strategy and elasticity of demand.”).  Therefore, when a 
producer sets certain prices that change demand for its goods, 
then the wholesaler‟s sales, prices, and profits may also be 
affected.  This is also true even though Warren General 
received the earnings from the rebates after it paid for the 
products, because Amgen would need to determine how high 
a price the market would tolerate, and what to set the rebates 
at in order to maximize purchases of its RBCGF and WBCGF 
drug.  All of these factors would make it difficult to 
determine the extent of Warren General and 
AmerisourceBergen‟s injuries, and, as the UtiliCorp Court 
explained, consistent application of the direct purchaser rule 
is necessary to avoid being mired in these difficult 
calculations.  497 U.S. at 211.  
 
 We find the Ninth Circuit‟s decision in Delaware 
Valley Surgical Supply Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 523 F.3d 
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1116 (9th Cir. 2008) to be instructive.
12
  In that case, a 
hospital that purchased Johnson & Johnson medical products 
through a medical supply company brought price-fixing and 
monopoly claims under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.  Id. at 
1118, 1122-23.  The hospital was a member of a GPO; the 
GPO negotiated an agreement with Johnson & Johnson 
setting the prices for certain medical products on the 
hospital‟s behalf.  Id. at 1119.  Using those prices, the 
hospital negotiated its own contract with Johnson & Johnson, 
but ultimately purchased the products through a separate 
contract with a wholesaler.  Id.   
 
 The Ninth Circuit rejected the hospital‟s argument that 
this independent contractual relationship with Johnson & 
Johnson gave it antitrust standing.  Because the hospital 
purchased the products through a GPO, the court was bound 
by the “sensible and straightforward” “bright line rule” set 
forth in Illinois Brick.  Id. at 1122.  For two other reasons, the 
court also rejected the hospital‟s request for “a new rule . . . 
                                                          
 
12
 Warren General has attempted to distinguish cases 
arising from price-fixing antitrust claims from tying claims, 
on the ground that the direct purchaser rule has less traction in 
the latter.  The direct purchaser rule has its origins in statutory 
construction of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, Illinois Brick, 
431 U.S. at 736-37.  Therefore, as the hospital conceded at 
oral argument, it applies here.  See also Merican, 713 F.2d at 
967 (refusing to limit Illinois Brick to cases of horizontal 
price-fixing).  To the extent that Warren General argues that 
the harm caused by an illegal tying claim is distinct from the 
harm caused by a price-fixing conspiracy, we find that 
argument unpersuasive, given the possible injuries in this 
case. 
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better attuned to . . . health care providers and 
manufacturers.”  Id. at 1123.  First, it explained UtiliCorp 
foreclosed the possibility of any “leeway to make a policy 
determination on a case-by-case basis . . . when there are 
special business arrangements.”  Id. at 1124.  Second, 
conferring standing on the hospital would offend the policy 
rationales underlying the rule.  Contrary to the hospital‟s 
assertions, the “distributor is not a completely irrelevant 
economic actor” in the economic transaction, and therefore 
the risk of multiple liability and complicated economic injury 
calculations was present.  Id.  The price increases created by 
the defendant‟s anticompetitive practices might affect the 
demand for the products the wholesaler sells, even if the price 
increase is borne by the indirect purchaser.  Id.  Apportioning 
the effect of the overcharge would continue to “force courts 
to engage in complex factual inquiries” that the direct 
purchaser rule was created to avoid.  Id.   
 
 Therefore, because of the possibility that 
AmerisourceBergen was injured by Amgen‟s actions, we find 
that the risk of multiple liability is also present.  Moreover, 
even if we agreed that the middleman purchaser was unable 
or unwilling to bring a suit, that conclusion does not 
necessarily weigh in favor of giving the indirect purchaser 
standing.  The Supreme Court confronted a similar possibility 
in Illinois Brick, when it recognized the possibility that direct 
purchasers would “refrain from bringing a treble-damages 
suit,” in that case “for fear of disrupting relations with their 
suppliers.”  431 U.S. at 746.  Nonetheless, the Court found 
that application of the direct purchaser rule was warranted, 
because “on balance . . . the legislative purpose in creating a 
group of private attorneys general to enforce the antitrust laws 
. . . is better served by holding direct purchasers to be injured 
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to the full extent of the overcharge paid by them than by 
attempting to apportion the overcharge among all that may 
have absorbed a part of it.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  In Merican, we were confronted with a situation 
where the direct purchaser had executed an affidavit stating 
that it had not suffered any injuries from the allegedly illegal 
antitrust action.  713 F.2d at 968-99.  Even there, we refused 
to extend standing to the indirect purchaser in part because 
Illinois Brick had “recognized . . . that it was possible that 
direct purchasers might not sue their suppliers in all cases,” 
yet still held that only direct purchasers had standing under 
Section 4.  Id. at 969.   
 
  Third, given the complexities of apportionment and 
the possibility of multiple recovery, the third Illinois Brick 
rationale, which prioritizes efficient enforcement of the 
antitrust laws, also weighs in favor of applying the direct 
purchaser rule.
13
 
 Ultimately, whether all of the policy rationales 
underpinning Illinois Brick are exactly replicated in the case 
before us is not dispositive.  The UtiliCorp Court expressly 
recognized that “[t]he rationales underlying Hanover Shoe 
                                                          
 
13
 We take note of Warren General‟s argument that 
AmerisourceBergen would not have standing to bring an 
antitrust action under Section 4, because it was not injured by 
Amgen‟s actions.  However, that issue is not before us and 
the existence or non-existence of AmerisourceBergen‟s 
injuries was not considered by the District Court, thus there is 
no record for us to review.  Therefore, we do not find that 
only a suit brought by Warren General would enforce the 
antitrust laws. 
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and Illinois Brick will not apply with equal force in all cases.”  
497 U.S. at 216.  Yet even then, the rule applies.  Id.  
 
  
 While we are sympathetic to Warren General‟s 
complaints regarding Amgen‟s rebate program, our 
examination of the principles animating Hanover Shoe, 
Illinois Brick, and UtiliCorp confirm that application of the 
Court‟s bright line rule is appropriate in this case. 
 
IV.  
 
 For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
District Court is affirmed.  
